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statutes making it a capital offense to steal a pair of breeches, but a statute
cannot constrain a jury to pronounce unjustly the irretrievable judgment.
We recall a celebrated case at Pevensey: * **
NATHAN PROBST, JR.
St. John's University School of Law.

THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM. By William Yandell Elliott. New
York: Whittlesey House, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1935, pp. xi, 286.
Thanks are due to Prof. Elliott for defining with such clarity and directness the major political problem which confronts us. The complexities and
demands of an industrialized civilization have overwhelmed a governmental
system fashioned by a simple society in accordance with ideas that were derived
from an even earlier and more primitive economy. With force and particularity, Prof. Elliott establishes the inadequacy of our political machinery, its
inability successfully to order and direct the bewildering forces of modern life.
There is clearly a need for constitutional reform.
But, if Prof. Elliott's clinical findings are accurate, his diagnosis lacks
the penetration one may expect from him and the remedies which he prescribes
are far from enough to effect a cure. For him the chief vice is patronage.
While one may readily concede that this is a vexatious evil, it scarcely deserves
the major role ascribed to it. Even the complete eradication of patronage and
the firm establishment of both appointments and promotions on the basis of
merit will not take us far towards a solution of our problem. Patronage,
rather than being a prime cause, is itself only a resultant of the operation of
the hidden forces which have brought into existence the powerful party machines
that dominate our political life and bend public officers to their will. A thorough understanding of the character and workings of these forces, to be
gained only by searching inquiry, is preliminary to any effort at reform.
Nor can I subscribe to the criticism of our legislatures and to the doctrine
that salvation lies in the elevation of the executive. I retain a great regard
for our legislatures. It is difficult for me to see how we can preserve political
democracy without making sure that the formulation of major policy shall
continue in the hands of representative legislative bodies. Before we pin our
faith altogether to the executive, let us remember the blunders that we have
witnessed in that department. There is nothing in recent administrations to
inspire any great confidence either in executive capability or in its wisdom.
The major mistakes of recent regimes may be attributed to executive policy
rather than to a Congress which has ofttimes yielded reluctantly to the demands
of insistent administrative officers. Much that has been written and said to
discredit our legislatures comes from sources that are too obviously interested
to be swallowed whole.
Rather than subordinating the legislative branch to the executive, we
would do better to integrate the two. The check and balance system of which,
curiously enough, we are so proud, is far more responsible for inefficiency and
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impotence ib the conduct of the public business than is patronage. The time
will soon cone when it must give way before the demand for public authority
that can act promptly and decisively.
Prof. Elliott recognizes the important role which is played by groups
united by a common interest and that the needs of such groups must be reflected
in public policy. It is a pity, therefore, that he did not direct his talents to a
study of the means for permitting organized groups direct participation in
governmental processes without need of recourse to insidious lobbying. A
great many of the shortcomings of our legislators are due not to any perversity but simply to the fact that it has become physically impossible for them
to represent their constituents properly. Within almost any legislative district
there is to be found every variety of economic and social interest, ofttimes in
sharpest conflict on every important issue. Just how can the representative
speak for these divergent groups in the legislative halls? Perhaps the time
has come to re-examine the whole structure of our representative institutions,
resting as they do on a geographic division of our people. That may have
served in an earlier day when the bulk of the population in any given area was
fairly uniform in economic interest and, therefore, in fundamental outlook. It
is questionable whether such a division has validity in an industrial community.
A system of representation fitted to the actualities of present-day life would
make government a more responsive social instrument and should go far to
eradicate the surreptitious pressure by special groups of which the author so
justly complains.
So, too, Prof. Elliott realizes that modern conditions require that control
over social-policy be taken from the courts. Yet his proposal to have the
Supreme Court declare laws unconstitutional only by a two-thirds vote would
not accomplish the result. It would still mean that every legislative and administrative act would have to be submitted to judicial scrutiny before there could
be assurance of validity. Judicial supremacy was accepted in this country
because it insured maximum protection of individual freedom and private
property in answer to the requirements of a young people eager to exploit the
resources of a virgin continent. Under modern conditions it is fast becoming
an anomaly and may soon prove to be more of a hindrance than an aid. Its
continuance in our constitutional system will stand in the way of developing a
government capable of dealing adequately with the complexities of our present
society. It will undoubtedly come hard, but the necessities of our changed life
will compel a sharp restriction on the scope of judicial review.
The major proposal advanced by Prof. Elliott is that the states as we
now have them be abolished and that in their place the country be divided into
a few large administrative regions. Such a program has much to justify it in
economic fact. Yet we cannot wait for a solution of the problems that are
pressing until so startling a change has been effected. Were he to attempt to
translate his proposal into effective law, Prof. Elliott would find more than
the office holders of the several states arrayed in opposition. I doubt that any
considerable body of public opinion is prepared for the destruction of our
states.
In fact, I do not believe that there is immediate chance of any fundamental reform through constitutional amendment. For reasons that are not quite
clear, the temper of the American people seems set against it, as witness the
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difficulties encountered by the child labor amendment. Any movement for
constitutional change would only divert our energies from the immediate tasks
for many years to come.
The students of our political system, it seems to me, should undertake the
finding of a way whereby, under existing constitutional forms and in line with
accepted judicial precedent, it would be possible to integrate national and state
authority in the furtherance of a broad program of social control and reform.
Little has as yet been done on this problem. I am satisfied that with thought
and patience it can be solved.
Prof. Elliott's book may well prove to be the needed stimulus to the
making of the effort. It is a challenge and a call to action.
HERMAN A. GRAY.
New York University School of Law.

LAW AND THE LAWYERS. By Edward Stevens Robinson.
Macmillan Company, 1935, pp. xi, 348.

New York: The

In Dean Pound's seminar on jurisprudence at the Harvard Law School,
we used to talk a good deal about the utilization of the sciences in the development of a sound jurisprudence. My recollection is dimmed by the passing
years, but I have the impression that we agreed that the most important was
the science of economics. The thesis, however, of the present volume is that
it is "a fundamental principle of the new philosophy of law to recognize that
every important legal problem is at bottom a psychological problem and. that
every one of the many traditions about human nature which are to be found
in legal learning needs to be gone over from the standpoint of modern psychological knowledge." This view, however, is not quite as remarkable in a book
about law written by a psychologist as it would have been in a psychological
analysis of the law written by a lawyer.
We think that the philosophy of the law ought to be descriptive in that it
ought to tell how law is made. The practical man, quoted by the author, who
wanted to know whether the author was talking "about how judges ought to
think or * * * simply speculating about how they do think," had raised a very
serious and important question which must be answered before the field of
jurisprudence is definitely delimited. We are of opinion that jurisprudence must
tell us how judges do think, how decisions are reached, how statutes are made
and how administrative acts are determined. The possibilities are not infinite
and can even be described within the short compass of a book review.
There are still among us the naive who believe that law consists of a fixed
body of rules and principles upon which judges, legislators and administrative
tribunals draw in making decisions. This is the philosophy of many laymen
unequipped with a technical knowledge of the law. It is the philosophy which
many law students in law schools share, and who do not hesitate to articulate
their disappointment as the various courses of study unfold before them.

